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Abstract. At ASIACRYPT 1991, Even and Mansour introduced a block
cipher construction based on a single permutation. Their construction
has since been lauded for its simplicity, yet also criticized for not provid-
ing the same security as other block ciphers against generic attacks. In
this paper, we prove that if a small number of plaintexts are encrypted
under multiple independent keys, the Even-Mansour construction sur-
prisingly offers similar security as an ideal block cipher with the same
block and key size. Note that this multi-key setting is of high practical
relevance, as real-world implementations often allow frequent rekeying.
We hope that the results in this paper will further encourage the use of
the Even-Mansour construction, especially when a secure and efficient
implementation of a key schedule would result in significant overhead.
Keywords: Even-Mansour, multi-key setting, broadcast attack, related-
key setting.
1 Introduction
Modern block cipher design is based on the concept of iterating a round func-
tion [44]. This round function typically consists of a subkey addition followed by
an unkeyed invertible function. All commonly-used block ciphers, including the
DES [46] and AES [23] standards, follow this design strategy.
As such, the design of an iterated block cipher consists of two parts: the
design of a round function, and a key schedule to generate the subkeys for every
round. Although round function design seems to be a relatively well-understood
problem, this is much less the case for the key schedule. For example, Rijmen
and Daemen already stated in the AES design book that: “There is no consen-
sus on the criteria that a key schedule must satisfy [23, p. 77]. This fact has
been repeated many times since, for example in the SHA-3 finalist Grøstl design
document [32, p. 5]. In particular, there seems to be no consensus on whether
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a “strong” or a “simple” key schedule is required, a choice which appears to
depend on the application.
An argument for a “simple” key schedule is that keys should be chosen uni-
formly at random from the entire key space anyway, in order to avoid a speed-up
of brute-force attacks due to low key entropy. As a result, attacks based on weak
keys [25] and known keys [42] are no longer applicable. Similarly, when multiple
keys are used, they should be chosen independently to prevent a compromise of
one key helping the recovery of other keys. This avoids attacks based on related
keys [9–11].
Proponents of a “strong” key schedule point out that in practice, keys may
not always be chosen independently from a uniformly random distribution. The
cause of this could be a weak protocol, a programming error or an insecure
implementation.
Complexity, however, always comes at a cost. It makes cryptosystems more
difficult to design, to implement and to analyze. Hence, we argue for a block
cipher with a simple key schedule, combined with the use of a secure key deriva-
tion function (KDF) [20] for secret-key applications. A KDF can be as simple
as using the same block cipher to encrypt a counter, in which case the imple-
mentation overhead is minimal. For a theoretical treatment of KDFs, we refer
to [1].
Although the use of a KDF avoids attacks on weak keys, known keys and
related keys, it cannot prevent multi-key attacks [12,14,24,38]: a plaintext may
be encrypted under multiple independent keys. Often overlooked by block cipher
designers, multi-key attacks are highly relevant in practice (cf. Sect. 2).
This leads us to the following open problem, formulated by Daemen and Rij-
men in 2012 [24]. In their paper, they point out: “A scenario where the adversary
can query the block cipher under related keys, or even multiple keys, inevitably
leads to security erosion”. Paraphrased, concerning the multi-key setting they
ask: “Can we design a secure block cipher with a lighter key schedule and higher
key agility if related-key security is not required?”
In this paper, we give a positive answer to their question. Surprisingly, one of
the simplest block ciphers, the single-key Even-Mansour construction3 [26,29,30],
shown in Fig. 1, offers similar security to an ideal block cipher when a small
number of plaintexts can be queried under many keys.
Outline. The single-key, related-key and multi-key attack settings are discussed
in Sect. 2, from a theoretical as well as a practical perspective. In Sect. 3, we
prove tight bounds for the security of an Even-Mansour block cipher and of an
ideal block cipher in the multi-key setting. The relevance of our observations
for the security and efficiency of block cipher implementations is discussed in
Sect. 4. We conclude the paper in Sect. 5.
3 Throughout this paper, we will always refer to the single-key variant of the Even-
Mansour construction, that is, using only a single n-bit key K.
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Fig. 1. The Even-Mansour construction.
2 Attack Settings
2.1 Three Attack Settings
Single-key setting. One key K is chosen uniformly at random from the key
space in the single-key setting, also referred to as the fixed-key setting. The
adversary can then make encryption and decryption queries to block cipher E,
all under the same key K.
Related-key setting. In the related-key setting, the adversary can perform
encryption and decryption queries to block cipher E under keys Ki. Each key i
satisfies the relationship Ki = Φi(K), where K is secret, but the functions Φi are
chosen by the adversary. To avoid that not every block cipher E is vulnerable to
a related-key attack, restrictions are necessary on the functions Φi as explained
in [9].
Security against related-key attacks is often considered in the design of a
block cipher. For example, it was a stated design goal for the AES block ci-
pher [23], although it was shown that AES is not secure against related-key
attacks [15,16].
Furthermore, it should be noted that certain commonly-used algorithms, in-
cluding DES and Triple-DES, are trivially insecure against related-key attacks.
For DES [46] and Triple-DES [6], this is an immediate result of its complementa-
tion property [36]: EK(P ) = EK(P ), where x represents the bitwise complement
of x.
It is difficult to say whether related-key security should be a requirement, as
this depends on the protocol in which the cryptosystem is used. Nevertheless,
it seems fair to point out that protocol designers should not assume related-
key security, given that several commonly-used designs are (sometimes trivially)
insecure in this setting.
Multi-key setting. In the multi-key setting, the adversary can query encryp-
tion and decryption queries under keys Ki, where all Ki are independently cho-
sen, uniformly at random. The multi-key setting can be seen as a generalization
of the multi-user setting of Chatterjee et al. [19], where encryption queries of
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only one plaintext P are allowed under keys Ki.
4 This multi-user setting is then
again a further generalization of the broadcast setting of Mantin and Shamir [45],
where the plaintext P is unknown to the attacker.
Every attack in the broadcast setting also leads to an attack in the multi-user
setting, and every multi-user attack is also a multi-key attack. We will therefore
use the multi-key setting throughout this paper, in order to evaluate the security
against the most powerful adversaries.
2.2 Practical Relevance of the Multi-Key Setting
The terms “broadcast” and “multi-user” imply a setting where one message is
sent to many users, encrypted under independent keys. Note, however, that this
setting does not actually require a large amount of users, and also applies to one
user that rekeys frequently.
Frequent rekeying is often a result of the common implementation practice
to use session keys. As explained in [48, § 12.2.2], session keys limit the available
ciphertext under the same key for cryptanalytic attacks, and limit the exposure
in case a session key is compromised.
Furthermore, rekeying is necessary in certain scenarios in order to avoid
cryptanalytical attacks or to comply with existing standards. It should be noted
that several cryptanalytical attacks have a higher success probability when more
plaintext-ciphertext pairs under a specific key are available [8].
For example, NIST limits the amount of plaintext that can be processed
under the same key to 232 blocks (32 GB) for three-key Triple-DES, and to 220
blocks (16 MB) for two-key Triple-DES [6]. In the case of MAC functions, NIST
not only recommends to limit the number of message blocks under the same key,
but also to limit the number of MAC failures before rekeying is required [27,28].
In the case of TLS, rekeying is required after only one MAC failure [34].
AlFardan et al. [3] showed that it is a realistic attack vector in the case of
TLS to obtain the encryption of one secret (a cookie or password) under mul-
tiple independent keys. They explained that this can be done either by using
JavaScript malware to generate multiple sessions, or by causing the session to
be terminated, after which some applications automatically reconnect and re-
transmit the cookie or password. As shown by Paterson et al. [54], the same
attack setting also applies to WPA-TKIP because of its use of per-packet keys.
2.3 Security in the Multi-Key Setting
As noted by Biham [12, 13], there exists a faster generic key-recovery attack on
any block cipher in the multi-key setting compared to the single-key setting.
4 In the model of Chatterjee et al. [19], an adversary can also corrupt any user of its
choosing, meaning that their key is given to the adversary. The goal of the adversary
is then to win the game for any uncorrupted user. Although it is straightforward to
take this refinement into account, we decided not to do this for the clarity of our
exposition.
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This can be seen as follows. To keep our explanation simple, let us assume in
this section that key size k equals the block size n.
In the single-key setting, an adversary with D = 1 plaintext-ciphertext pair
will need on average T = 2k−1 encryptions to recover the key by exhaustive
search with a success probability of about 50%. More plaintext-ciphertext pairs
will increase the success probability of the attack, as probability decreases that
a random key will be found instead of the correct key, but will not reduce the
time complexity of the attack.
Recovering one key can be done with a lower time complexity in the multi-key
setting. To see this, let an attacker have D encryptions
EK1(P ), EK2(P ), . . . , EKD (P ) (1)
of the same plaintext P under multiple independent keys K1,K2, . . . ,KD. Then,
after on average T = 2k−1/D encryptions of the plaintext P , one of the keys
K1,K2, . . . ,KD will be recovered with a success probability of about 50%.
Besides this observation, Biham also remarked in [12, 13] that key collisions
become likely in this multi-key setting after about D = 2k/2 plaintext-ciphertext
pairs. Consequently, the key size k should be chosen to be sufficiently large by
design to avoid key collision attacks.
In Sect. 3, we will prove that the Even-Mansour construction has similar
security to an ideal block cipher in the multi-key setting, assuming the number
of plaintexts queried per key is small. Or put differently, when multi-key attacks
with a small amount of plaintext per key are taken into account, there is little
advantage in choosing a block cipher with a more complicated key schedule than
the Even-Mansour construction.
2.4 Related Work
The time-memory tradeoff of Hellman [37] is not a concern for block ciphers with
a reasonably long key size, because its precomputation time is the same as that
of exhaustive key search. This is different from the time-memory-data tradeoffs
for stream ciphers of Babbage-Golic´ [5,33] and Biryukov-Shamir [17], where the
time complexity can be far below exhaustive search.
As shown by Hong and Sarkar [38], and independently by Birykov [14], the
stream cipher time-memory-data tradeoffs can be applied to the block cipher
setting as well, assuming that a plaintext is encrypted under multiple keys.
Their work generalizes the findings of Biham that we presented in Sect. 2.3.
Chatterjee, Koblitz, Menezes and Sarkar critiqued the security proofs of
symmetric-key encryption and authentication modes [19, 43, 47], pointing out
that security is often reduced when a multi-user setting is considered.
Their findings inspired Fouque et al. [31] to look at collision search algorithms
in the multi-user setting. One of their results is the first analysis of the Even-
Mansour construction in the multi-user setting. We will use an entirely different
approach in this paper, by considering information-theoretic adversaries that are
only limited by the number of queries to the Even-Mansour block cipher and to
5
the underlying permutation. As we will show, the attack by Fouque et al. reaches
the security bound that we will prove for the Even-Mansour construction in the
multi-key setting.
A recent paper by Andreeva et al. [4] considers the security of keyed sponge
constructions in the single-target and multi-target scenarios, which are similar
to our single-key and multi-key settings. The approach that we follow in this
paper is different, as we introduce these concepts in a more general way. Fur-
thermore, we do not express the attacks and security bounds in terms of the
“total maximum multiplicity µ,” a parameter that is specific to the analysis of
sponge constructions.
Note that the multi-user setting is not only relevant for symmetric-key cryp-
tography, but also for public-key cryptography. For a theoretical treatment of
public-key encryption in the multi-user setting, we refer to Bellare et al. [7].
3 Security Proofs in the Multi-Key Setting
Block cipher security in the multi-key setting is formalized with a distinguisher
comparing two worlds, one in which the distinguisher is given access to a block
cipher instantiated with ℓ keys, and one in which it is given access to ℓ indepen-
dent permutations. Our focus is on constructions in the ideal model, meaning
they make use of an ideal primitive.
Definition 1. An ideal primitive is a uniformly distributed random variable
over a set of functions F .
These primitives model basic components from which cryptographic algorithms
are constructed. In line with Kerckhoffs’s principle, ideal primitives are public
and can be accessed by adversaries in security definitions. The adversaries them-
selves are information-theoretic and are only bounded in the number of queries
they make to each oracle.
Let perm(n) denote the set of all permutations on n bits, and block(k, n)
denote the set of all block ciphers with k-bit key and n-bit block size. Let ℓ
denote number of keys Ki under which the adversary performs queries, that is,
there is at least one query for every key Ki for 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ.
Definition 2 (Multi-Key Security). Let Π be a primitive and EΠ a random
variable over block(k, n). Given an adversary A, its multi-key advantage with
respect to ℓ keys is
AdvmkE (A) =
∣∣∣Pr
(
AE
Π
K1
,EΠ
K2
,...,EΠ
Kℓ
,Π → 1
)
− Pr
(
Ap1,p2,...,pℓ,Π → 1
)∣∣∣ , (2)
where the keys K1, . . . ,Kℓ are independently and uniformly drawn from {0, 1}
k,
and p1, . . . , pℓ are independently and uniformly drawn from perm(n). The adver-
sary A has access to both forward and inverse oracles.
In the case of the Even-Mansour block cipher, the primitive Π is a permutation,
whereas for an ideal block cipher, the primitive Π is the block cipher itself.
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Note that our definition is similar to the “3PRP” notion in the security
analysis of Chaskey [49], however we consider ℓ independent keys instead of
three keys that are related to each other. Our definition also closely follows the
“Joint Distinguishing Advantage” of Andreeva et al. [4, Definition 2], except that
the total maximum multiplicity µ is not a parameter in our security definition.
A
π
K1
K1
π
K2
K2
π
Kℓ
Kℓ
· · · π p1 p2 pℓ· · · π
· · ·
Fig. 2. An Even-Mansour block cipher EK(P ) = π(P ⊕ K) ⊕ K in the multi-key
setting. Although only one direction is shown, inverse oracles can be accessed as well.
The number of queries by the adversary A to any of the first ℓ oracles is denoted by
D, the number of queries to the last oracle by T .
Theorem 1 (Even-Mansour Multi-Key Security). Let EM be the Even-
Mansour block cipher EK(P ) = π(P ⊕K) ⊕K, then for all A making at most
D queries to EK1 , . . . , EKℓ (resp. p1, . . . , pℓ) or their inverses and at most T
queries to π or π−1,
AdvmkEM(A) ≤
D2 + 2DT
2n
. (3)
Our proof is similar to the security proof of the MAC function Chaskey [49],
except that we now consider that ℓ keys are drawn independently and uniformly
at random. The proof uses Patarin’s H-coefficient technique [53]. For a detailed
explanation of this technique, we refer to Chen and Steinberger [21]. The proof
can be seen as a generalization of the security analysis of the Even-Mansour
block cipher [29,30].
Proof. As shown in Fig. 2, we consider an adversary A that has bidirectional ac-
cess to ℓ+1 oracles (O1, . . . ,Oℓ+1). In the real world, these are (EK1 , . . . , EKℓ , π)
(where EK(P ) = π(P⊕K)⊕K) withKi
$
←− {0, 1}n for i = 1, . . . , ℓ, π
$
←− perm(n),
and in the ideal world these are (p1, . . . , pℓ, π)
$
←− perm(n)ℓ+1. Without loss of
generality we assume that A is deterministic. It makes Di queries to oracle Oi
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for i = 1, . . . , ℓ, and T queries to Oℓ+1. Let D =
∑ℓ
i=1Di. To be overly generous
to the adversary A, after it has made all of its D + T queries, but before it
outputs its decision, we will reveal the keys K1, . . . ,Kℓ (in the real world) or
randomly generated dummy keys K1, . . . ,Kℓ (in the ideal world).
The interaction of A with the oracles can be summarized by a transcript
τ = (K1, . . . ,Kℓ, τ1, . . . , τℓ+1). Here, the directionless list of queries to Oj for
i = 1, . . . , ℓ is denoted by τi = {(P
(1)
i , C
(1)
i ), . . . , (P
(Di)
i , C
(Di)
i )}, and to Oℓ+1
by τℓ+1 = {(x
(1), y(1)), . . . , (x(T ), y(T ))}. We assume the adversary never makes
duplicate queries, so that P
(j)
i 6= P
(j′)
i , C
(j)
i 6= C
(j′)
i , x
(j) 6= x(j
′), and y(j) 6= y(j
′)
for all i, j, j′ where j 6= j′.
Given the fixed deterministic adversary A, we denote the probability distri-
bution of transcripts in the real world by X, and in the ideal world by Y . We
say that a transcript τ is attainable if it can be obtained from interacting with
(p1, . . . , pℓ, π), hence if Pr (Y = τ) > 0. According to the H-coefficient technique,
we have (see [21] for a proof):
Lemma 1 (H-coefficient Technique). Let us consider a fixed deterministic
adversary A, and let T = Tgood ∪ Tbad be a partition of the set of attainable
transcripts. Let ε be such that for all τ ∈ Tgood
Pr (X = τ)
Pr (Y = τ)
≥ 1− ε . (4)
Then, AdvmkEM(A) ≤ ε+ Pr (Y ∈ Tbad).
We say that a transcript τ is bad if two different queries would result in the
same input or output to π, were A interacting with the real world. Put formally,
τ is bad if one of the following conditions is set:
∃i, i′, j, j′ : i 6= i′ : P
(j)
i ⊕P
(j′)
i′ = Ki ⊕Ki′ ∨ C
(j)
i ⊕ C
(j′)
i′ = Ki ⊕Ki′ , (5)
∃i, j, j′ : P
(j)
i ⊕ x
(j′) = Ki ∨ C
(j)
i ⊕ x
(j′) = Ki . (6)
A transcript that is not a bad transcript, is referred to as a good transcript.
Upper Bounding Pr (Y ∈ Tbad). We want to upper bound the event that
a transcript τ in the ideal world satisfies (5)–(6). Note that Ki
$
←− {0, 1}n for
i = 1, . . . , ℓ are dummy keys generated independently of τ1, . . . , τℓ. Therefore,
there are at most 2DiDi′ possible keys that satisfy (5) for any fixed i 6= i
′.
Analogously, there are at most 2DiT possible keys that satisfy (6) for any fixed
i. Therefore,
Pr (Y ∈ Tbad) ≤
∑
i
∑
i′<i 2DiDi′ +
∑
i 2DiT
2n
, (7)
≤
D2 + 2DT
2n
. (8)
8
Lower Bounding Ratio Pr (X = τ ) /Pr (Y = τ ). Let us consider a good
and attainable transcript τ ∈ Tgood. Then denote by ΩX = 2
nℓ · 2n! the set of
all possible oracles in the real world and by compX(τ) ⊆ ΩX the set of oracles
in ΩX compatible with transcript τ . Define ΩY = 2
nℓ · (2n!)ℓ+1 and compY (τ)
similarly. According to the H-coefficient technique:
Pr (X = τ) =
|compX(τ)|
|ΩX |
, and Pr (Y = τ) =
|compY (τ)|
|ΩY |
. (9)
First, we calculate |compX(τ)|. As τ ∈ Tgood, there are no two queries in τ with
the same input to or output of the underlying permutation. Any query tuple in
τ therefore fixes exactly one input-output pair of the underlying oracle. Because
τ consists of D+T query tuples, the number of possible oracles in the real world
equals (2n −D − T )!. By a similar reasoning, the number of possible oracles in
the ideal world equals
∏ℓ
i=1(2
n −Di)! · (2
n − T )!. Therefore,
Pr (X = τ) =
(2n −D − T )!
2nℓ · 2n!
, (10)
Pr (Y = τ) =
∏ℓ
i=1(2
n −Di)! · (2
n − T )!
2nℓ · (2n!)ℓ+1
≤
(2n −D − T )! · (2n!)ℓ
2nℓ · (2n!)ℓ+1
. (11)
It then follows that Pr (X = τ) /Pr (Y = τ) ≥ 1. ⊓⊔
A
E
K1
E E· · · E p1 p2 pℓ· · · E
· · ·
K2 Kℓ
Fig. 3. An ideal block cipher EK in the multi-key setting. Although only one direction
is shown, all oracles are assumed to be bidirectional.
Theorem 2 (Ideal Block Cipher Multi-Key Security). Let the ideal block
cipher IBC be uniformly distributed random variable over block(k, n), then for all
A making at most D queries to EK1 , . . . , EKℓ (resp. p1, . . . , pℓ) or their inverses
and at most T queries to EK or its inverse under adversary-chosen keys,
AdvmkIBC(A) ≤
ℓ2 + 2ℓT
2k+1
. (12)
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Proof. We consider the adversary A shown in Fig. 3. Define E to be the event
where either
1. there exists i 6= j such that Ki = Kj or
2. there exists a query E(K,X) or E−1(K,X) such that K = Ki for some i.
Given that E does not happen, EK1 , . . . , EKℓ are drawn independently and uni-
formly at random from perm(n), and all queries made to E are independent of
EK1 , . . . , EKℓ . Therefore (EK1 , . . . , EKℓ , E) and (p1, . . . , pℓ, E) are indistinguish-
able given the negation of E, and by the fundamental lemma of game playing,
AdvmkIBC(A) ≤ Pr (E) . (13)
The probability that there exists an adversary query E(K,X) or E−1(K,X) such
that K = Ki is at most
Tℓ
2k
. The probability that two keys collide is bounded
above by ℓ
2
2k+1
, hence
Pr (E) ≤
ℓ2 + 2ℓT
2k+1
. (14)
⊓⊔
By our definition, there must be at least one query for every key. Therefore
D ≥ ℓ, so that the following corollary can be derived from Theorem 2:
Corollary 1 (Corollary of Theorem 2).
AdvmkIBC(A) ≤
D2 + 2DT
2k+1
. (15)
Observe that when the amount of plaintext per key is small, this bound is close
to that of Theorem 2.
3.1 Tightness of the Security Bounds
Several attacks have been published that match the security bound of the Even-
Mansour block cipher in the single-key setting. The first attacks were published
by Daemen [22]: a known-plaintext attack for D = 2 and a chosen-plaintext
attack for any value ofD. Biruykov and Wagner [18] presented a known-plaintext
attack for D ≥ 2n/2. A known-plaintext attack for any value of D was given by
Dunkelman et al. [26].
The single-key setting is a special case of the multi-key setting where ℓ = 1.
We proved in Sect. 3 (see Theorem 1) that the security bound of Even-Mansour in
multi-key setting is a straightforward extension of the single-key setting. There-
fore, the bound that we derived for Even-Mansour in the multi-key setting is
also tight.
An attack matching our Even-Mansour security bound in the multi-key set-
ting was recently given by Fouque et al. [31] for ℓ = 2n/3, Di = 2
n/3 for
i = 1, . . . , ℓ and T = 2n/3.
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In the case of an ideal block cipher in the multi-key setting with D = ℓ, the
key collision and time-memory trade-off attacks of Biham [12,13] show that the
security bound of Corollary 1 is also tight. For a discussion of these attacks and
their subsequent improvements, we refer to Sect. 2.3. Evidently, these attacks
are also applicable to the Even-Mansour block cipher in the multi-key setting.
4 Discussion
As we proved in Sect. 3, the Even-Mansour block cipher has similar security in
the multi-key setting as an ideal block cipher with the same block and key size,
assuming D ≈ ℓ. In Sect. 2.2, we pointed out the relevance of this multi-key
setting in practice.
The Even-Mansour block cipher is interesting from a design point of view
because of its simplicity. As Dunkelman et al. [26] argued, it also achieves mini-
malism, in the sense that removing any component (one of the two key additions
or the permutation) results in an insecure construction. But the Even-Mansour
construction also has many implementation advantages.
From an efficiency point of view, the Even-Mansour block cipher avoids that
round keys need to be precalculated and stored in memory, or that they need to
be calculated on-the-fly. Avoiding precalculation of the key schedule results in a
higher key agility, because of the lower cost to rekey. If round keys do not need
to be calculated on-the-fly, the efficiency of every block cipher call increases. For
software implementations, avoiding a key schedule reduces register pressure and
decreases RAM requirements. The amount of RAM is very critical on certain
microcontrollers, as shown for example in [39].
From a security point of view, the Even-Mansour block cipher avoids the
need to store round keys securely. Note that in the case of AES-128, recovery of
any round key leads to recovery of the encryption key. In the case of AES with
192-bit or 256-bit keys, any two consecutive round keys can be used to recover
the encryption key.
Secure key storage is not only a problem for smart cards and RFID tags, but
is also difficult to ensure on general purpose CPUs. The virtual memory system
may move cryptographic keys into swap storage, which necessitates error-prone
techniques to avoid swapping, or to use swap encryption [57].
But even in the presence of these countermeasures, cold boot attacks [35]
may be used to exploit the fact that DRAM retains a large part of its memory
for several seconds after removing power. Cooling techniques may be used to
increase this time to several hours or even days.
If the round keys that are recovered by a cold boot attack contain errors (due
to memory bit decay), it may still be possible to recover the encryption key. For
AES, Halderman et al. [35] describe a simple algorithm to recover the encryption
key in this case. Improved attacks were later given by Albrecht et al. [2] using
integer programming, and by Tsow [58], and Kamal and Youssef [41] using a
SAT solver.
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The Even-Mansour block cipher avoids all attacks that recover the encryption
key from multiple noisy round keys, as it avoids the calculation of round keys
altogether. The leakage of encryption keys or round keys cannot be avoided
without additional security measures, for example by ensuring they are only
stored in the processor registers and not in RAM [50,51]. However, this problem
becomes much more manageable for the Even-Mansour construction, as only one
n-bit key needs to be protected, instead of multiple round keys.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
Rekeying occurs frequently in real-world implementations, meaning that a plain-
text may be encrypted under different keys. This setting is used, for example,
in the attacks by AlFardan et al. [3] on TLS, and by Paterson et al. [54] on
WPA-TKIP.
This setting is often referred to as the broadcast setting or the multi-user
setting. In this paper, we introduced the multi-key setting to generalize the
aforementioned settings. In the multi-key setting, the adversary can perform
chosen-plaintext and chosen-ciphertext attacks under a set of unknown keys.
In the multi-key setting, we proved that the Even-Mansour block cipher is
secure up to (D2 + 2DT )/2n queries. We proved a similar bound for an ideal
block cipher with k = n, and showed that both bounds are tight. We used our
proofs to argue in favor of the Even-Mansour construction: not only because of
the simplicity of its design, but also because the lack of a key schedule makes it
easier to generate fast and secure implementations.
Modes of operation for encryption and/or authentication may be designed
more efficiently, if it is known that the underlying block cipher follows the Even-
Mansour construction. It also seems that an Even-Mansour block cipher may
still be secure if the underlying permutation is far from ideal, an idea that was
pioneered by the design of the Chaskey MAC function [49]. We leave the further
exploration of these research questions to future work.
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